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Abstract
Making decisions freely presupposes that there is some indeterminacy in
the environment and in the decision making engine. The former is reflected
on the behavioral changes due to communicating: few changes indicate rigid
environments; productive changes manifest a moderate indeterminacy, but a
large communicating effort with few productive changes characterize a chaotic
environment. Hence, communicating, effective decision making and productive
behavioral changes are related. The entropy measures the indeterminacy of the
environment, and there is an entropy range in which communicating supports
effective decision making. This conjecture is referred to here as the The Potential
Productivity of Decisions.
The computing engine that is causal to decision making should also have
some indeterminacy. However, computations performed by standard Turing
Machines are predetermined. To overcome this limitation an entropic mode of
computing that is called here Relational-Indeterminate is presented. Its imple-
mentation in a table format has been used to model an associative memory.
The present theory and experiment suggest the Entropy Trade-off : There is an
entropy range in which computing is effective but if the entropy is too low com-
putations are too rigid and if it is too high computations are unfeasible. The
entropy trade-off of computing engines corresponds to the potential productivity
of decisions of the environment.
The theory is referred to an Interaction-Oriented Cognitive Architecture.
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Memory, perception, action and thought involve a level of indeterminacy and
decision making may be free in such degree. The overall theory supports an
ecological view of rationality. The entropy of the brain has been measured
in neuroscience studies and the present theory supports that the brain is an
entropic machine. The paper is concluded with a number of predictions that
may be tested empirically.
Keywords: Communication and computing Entropy, Potential Productivity
of Decisions, Entropy Trade-Off, Relational-Indeterminate Computing, Table
Computing, Minimal Algorithms, Decision Making Trade-Off, Interpretation,
Action, Associative Memory, Principle of Rationality, Cognitive Architecture
1. Potential Productivity of Decisions
People and machines make decisions all the time but the question is whether
these are made freely or are rather predetermined. This is the old opposition
between determinism and free will. The latter presupposes that there must be
some indeterminacy either in the environment in which the decision is made or
in the mind of the decision maker, or in both.
The indeterminacy corresponds to the information content of the environ-
ment or the control volume. Information is measured in communication theory
with Shannon’s entropy [1]: s = −∑ni=1 p(xi) × log2(p(xi)). This is a formula
of expected value. The term log2(p(xi)) is the length in bits of a message with
probability p(xi); therefore, the entropy is the average length of a message in
the communication environment. The probability of a message corresponds to
the probability of the reported event. Events that are certain to occur have
probability of one, and need not be communicated, or are communicated with
“messages of length zero”. The length of the message increases with its informa-
tion content and the larger the entropy the greater the amount of information
in the control volume. The information entropy reflects the uncertainty of the
events that need to be communicated and, consequently, the indeterminacy of
the environment.
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Communication is achieved through signals carrying messages but while the
former are physical phenomena the interpretation of the latter belongs to the
plane of content. The entropy times the total number of messages in the control
volume is proportional to the energy invested in communicating in such envi-
ronment over a period of time; hence, the entropy reflects the overall effort that
the community invest in communicating. These considerations are explicit or
follow directly from Shannon’s original presentation. Here, this discussion is ex-
tended to the relation between communication, decision making and behavioral
change.
Communication allows individuals of a society –the family, the school, the
office, the working institution, the church, the linguistic community, etc.– to
profit from the knowledge and experience of others. Communicative actions un-
derlie the intention to change the knowledge, beliefs, desires, feelings, emotions,
intentions and, most fundamentally, the course of action that the interlocutors
would undergo without the information provided. Communicating presupposes
that it is possible to change behavior. If the interlocutors are to deviate from
their normal course of action on the basis of novel information they must have
the choice; hence communication is a precondition for decision making in social
environments.
Effective decision making reflects the indeterminacy of the physical but also
the social environment. To enact a decision it must be physically and behav-
iorally possible: if the world or the society are too rigid, behavior cannot be
changed, decisions cannot be enacted, communicating is not reinforced and the
entropy is low. Conversely, productive behavioral changes due to communication
reflect effective decision making and that the environment is less determined,
with the corresponding larger entropy. However, large communication effort and
high entropy but with few productive behavioral changes reflect that decision
making is not effective and that the environment is too unpredictable or chaotic.
These considerations suggest that the entropy is not only a measure of the in-
determinacy of the physical environment but also of the plane of interpretation
or content, and that there is a range of entropy in which decision making is
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effective. This conjecture is called here The Potential Productivity of Decisions.
The relation between the entropy of communication environments and the
potential productivity of decisions, whose value is designated as τ , is illustrated
through the following scenarios, each defining a particular control volume:
• Factory production line: workers in a factory line do not communicate
and if they do, communication does not affect the dynamics of the envi-
ronment. The entropy and τ are very low or zero. There is no decision
making.
• Normal daily life: people communicate commonly to change beliefs and
behavior of others; speech acts in normal conversation aim to achieve such
an effect. The entropy is low or moderate and τ has an acceptable value.
There is space for decision making.
• Creative environments: people communicate effectively to make decisions
that if enacted have important consequences. The entropy and τ are opti-
mal. There is effective decision making with potential significant impact.
• Crisis situation: an earthquake or a pandemic. People communicate a
great deal and the entropy is very high but the environment is chaotic and
τ has a very low value. There may be a large decision making activity,
but decisions are not enacted or do not achieve the intended effect or do
it poorly.
The simplest characterization of the τ profile of environments is a gaussian
function ψ from the entropy s to the potential productivity of decisions, such
that τ = ψ(s) = ae−(s−s0)
2/2c2 where s ≥ 0, a is the value of τ at the optimal
entropy so, and c is the standard deviation. Each of the four scenarios above
correspond to a particular control volume with entropy si and productivity of
decisions τi. These are illustrated by shifting si from left to right in Figure 1.
The potential productivity of decisions can be seen as a cost-benefit pa-
rameter of communicating in a control volume. This is an ecological variable
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Figure 1: Potential Productivity of Decisions
indicating the degree to which communicating provides an adaptation advantage
and this behavior is reinforced. In the limiting case, when τ = 0, communication
is of little use and agents may be better off by themselves, and when τ is too
large communication is reduced to social noice. This conjecture may be tested
empirically.
Communication and decision making can be performed by a wide variety
of animal species that produce sounds or motor actions with communicative
intent. Such “speech acts” can be codified through messages, although most
species have a pretty determined “view of the world”, have limited abilities to
cope with environmental changes, and their entropy and τ may be both very
low. From an ecological and evolutive perspectives, the potential productivity
of decisions measures the degree in which the plane of content matters for the
species. Those that do not communicate or communicate little are limited to
behave reactively to the signals sensed in the environment, and there is no
reason to suppose that they sustain a plane of content or have a mind, and a
large communication effort that is not accompanied by productive behavioral
changes is not reinforced.
2. Relational-Indeterminate Computing
The computing engine that is causal and essential to decision making must
also have a choice. If such engine is deterministic, decisions are predetermined
and decision making is an illusion. According to standard thinking in Computer
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Science the Turing Machine (TM) is the most general computing machine –all
other general enough computing machines are equivalent to it– and this machine
is deterministic. In Computing Machinery and Intelligence [2] Turing stated
that the predictions made by digital computers are “rather nearer to practicality
than that considered by Laplace” (Turing, 1950, s.5). Laplace’s demon is indeed
a TM that computes all future and previous states of the universe given the full
set of the physical laws and the initial conditions of a particular state, and it does
so instantly. Hence, decisions “made” by digital computers are predetermined.
Computing machines hold physical states and interchange signals but do not
make interpretations and decisions by themselves. Communication, information,
knowledge and decision making are objects at plane of interpretation that is held
in the mind of humans and of other animals with a developed enough neural
system. For this, computing machinery is designed and used in relation to a
standard configuration, which defines the format of representations, and a set
of interpretation conventions.
The most basic interpretation convention in the theory of computability is
that every TM computes a particular function, and the enumeration of all TMs
correspond to the set of computational functions (e.g., [3]). A function is a
relation between two arbitrary sets of objects, the domain and the codomain,
whose members are called here the arguments and the values respectively, such
that an argument is related to one value at the most, and this relation is given
when the function is defined.
Mathematical objects are immutable, and the relation between the argu-
ments and values of all functions is fixed. Algorithms are mechanical procedures
that produce the value of the given argument, but the output of the computation
is predetermined. Algorithms can be seen as intensional definitions of functions
but the same knowledge can be expressed extensionally, as in tables, and what
an algorithm does is simply to render explicitly the implicit knowledge. For all
of this, under the standard interpretation conventions, TM computations are
predetermined by necessity. Hence, the entropy of a TM is zero, and the notion
of entropy is alien to the standard theory of TMs and computability.
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The absolute determinism of TMs can be questioned from the perspective of
the so-called non-deterministic automata [4]. There are non-deterministic finite
state automata that have an equivalent deterministic one, such as those accept-
ing regular languages; in this case, the non-determinism can be seen as a means
to express abstractions but the actual computations are deterministic; however,
there are automata that are genuinely non-deterministic, such as those accept-
ing ambiguous languages or machines that explore a problem space heuristically,
such as computer chess programs. In these latter cases the input or argument
is associated to more than one value and the object that is computed is not a
function but a mathematical relation.
The determinism of TMs is also questioned from the perspective of stochastic
computations. Turing suggested this strategy in the 1950 paper: when the
problem space is too large, it can be partitioned in regions, and the value of the
function for the given argument can be found by jumping into promising regions,
using random numbers. His example was the problem of finding whether a
number between 50 and 200 is equal to the sum of the squares of its constituent
digits (Turing, 1950, s.7). This problem has no solution but illustrates the
contrast between the deterministic strategy –iterating from the first to the last
number in the domain– and the stochastic one –choosing a number in the domain
randomly and making the test until the solution is found. This latter process
may never end, unless all trials are recorded and the computation finishes when
all the instances of the problem have been tested, but with a very high cost
in terms of memory and processing time. Turing called these methods the
systematic and the learning respectively, and stated that the latter may be
regarded as a search for a form of behavior and that “since there is probably
a very large number of satisfactory solutions the random method seems to be
better than the systematic” (Turing, 1950, s.7). As there are many solutions,
the object of computing is again a relation rather than a function.
The stochastic method requires that there is some indeterminacy in the
computing process. This was also made explicit by Turing who proposed a
variant of a digital computer with a random element, and that random numbers
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can be simulated in deterministic computers; for instance, by choosing the next
digit in the expansion of the number pi (Turing, 1950, s.4). These digits are
not known in advance but the sequence is predetermined, and such numbers
are pseudo-random rather than random; hence, computations involving them
are in the end determined. Genuine random numbers can be and are produced
by sensing a property of the external environment –that cannot be predicted–
whose value can be seen as a hidden argument of the stochastic algorithm.
Although such argument is not known, the object being computed is nevertheless
a function, and the process is still deterministic.
This limitation can be overcome by generalizing the interpretation conven-
tions and postulate that the object of computing is the mathematical relation
rather than the function. A relation assigns an arbitrary number of objects of
the codomain to each object in the domain. Hence, the value of the relation for
a given argument is indeterminate. To address this indeterminacy the basic no-
tion of evaluating a relation is construed here as choosing randomly one among
all the values of the relation for the given argument. This is: R(ai) = vj such
that vj is selected randomly –with an appropriate distribution– among the val-
ues associated to the argument ai in the relation R. This latter interpretation
convention is more general, computations become indeterminate, the computing
engine is stochastic and the machine has an intrinsic computing entropy. This
mode is called here Relational-Indeterminate Computing (RIC).
The entropy of a relational-indeterminate computation is defined here as the
normalized average indeterminacy of all the arguments of the relation R. Let µi
be the number of values associated to the argument ai in R, νi = 1/µi and n is
the cardinality of the domain. In case R is partial and µi = 0 for the argument
ai then νi = 1. The computational entropy e –or the entropy of R– is defined
here as e(R) = −1/n∑ni=1 log2(νi).
The communication and computational entropies have a common normalized
scale. A function has one value for all of its arguments and its entropy is zero.
Partial functions do not define a value for all the arguments, but this is fully
determined and the entropy of partial functions is also zero.
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The relational-indeterminate mode of computing focuses on relational infor-
mation and has three basic operations: abstraction, containment and reduction.
Let the sets A = {a1, ..., an} and V = {v1, ..., nm}, of cardinalities n and m, be
the domain and the codomain of a finite relation R : A → V . For purposes of
notation, for any relation R a function with the same name is defined as follows:
R : A× V → {0, 1} such that R(ai, vj) = 1 or true if the argument ai is related
to the value vj in R, and R(ai, vj) = 0 or false otherwise.
RCI has three basic operations: abstraction, containment and reduction. Let
Rf and Ra be two arbitrary relations from A to V , and fa be a function with
the same domain and codomain. The operations are defined as follows:
• Abstraction: λ(Rf , Ra) = R, such that R(ai, vj) = Rf (ai, vj) ∨Ra(ai, vj)
for all ai ∈ A and vj ∈ V –i.e., λ(Rf , Ra) = Rf ∪Ra.
• Containment: η(Ra, Rf ) is true if Ra(ai, vj) → Rf (ai, vj) for all ai ∈ A
and vj ∈ V (i.e., material implication), and false otherwise.
• Reduction: β(fa, Rf ) = fv such that, if η(fa, Rf ) holds, fv(ai) = Rf (ai)
for all ai, where the random distribution is centered around fa(ai). If
η(fa, Rf ) does not hold, β(fa, Rf ) is undefined –i.e., fv(ai) is undefined–
for all ai.
Abstraction is a construction operation that produces the union of two rela-
tions. A function is a relation and can be an input to the abstraction operation.
Any relation can be constructed out of the incremental abstraction of an ap-
propriate set of functions. The construction can be pictured graphically by
overlapping the graphical representation of the included functions on an empty
table, such that the columns correspond to the arguments, the rows to the values
and the functional relation is depicted by a mark in the intersecting cells.
The containment operation verifies whether all the values associated to an
argument ai of Ra are associated to the same argument of Rf for all the ar-
guments, such that Ra ⊆ Rf . More generally, the containment relation is false
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only in case Ra(ai, vj) = 1 and Rf (ai, vj) = 0 –or if Ra(ai, vj) > Rf (ai, vj)– for
at least one (ai, vj).
The set of functions that are contained in a relation, which is referred to here
as the constituent functions, may be larger than the set used in its construction.
The constituent functions are the combinations that can be formed by taking
one value among the ones that the relation assigns to an argument, for all the
arguments. The table format allows to perform the abstraction operation by
direct manipulation and the containment test by inspection. The construction
consists on forming a function by taking a value corresponding to a marked cell
of each column, for all values and for all columns. The containment is carried
on by verifying whether the table representing the function is contained within
the table representing the relation by testing all the corresponding cells through
material implication.
For this, the abstraction operation and the containment test are productive.
This is analogous to the generalization power of standard supervised machine
learning algorithms that recognize not only the objects included in the training
set but also other objects that are similar enough to the objects in such set.
Reduction is the functional application operation. If the argument function
fa is contained in the relation Rf , reduction generates a new function such that
the value assigned to each of its arguments is selected randomly from the values
assigned to the same argument in Rf . If fa is not contained in Rf the value of
such functional application operation is not defined. The reduction operation
selects a function included in the relation on the basis of a “cue” function. The
lower the entropy of the relation the larger the similarity between the object
retrieved from the relation and the cue. In the limiting case, when the entropy
of the relation is zero but reduction is applicable, the reduction selects the cue
itself.
The distinction between non-entropic and entropic computing corresponds
to the contrast between “local” versus “distributed” representations. Accord-
ing to Hinton [5], TMs hold local representations in which the units of form
are related one-to-one to their corresponding objects at the level of meaning
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or content, while in distributed representations this relation is many-to-many.
Representations in Turing machine are strings of symbols on the tape where
each word denotes a particular basic unit of content and non-basic meanings
are produced by the composition of the meanings of words into meanings of
phrases and sentences, but basic words are never overlapped on the tape or the
memory, and representations are local. In this setting basic representational
objects are mutually independent and the entropy is zero. This contrasts with
the representation of a set of functions overlapped on a table, where a marked
cell can contribute to the representation of more than one function and a func-
tion can share marked cells with other functions. Hence, the representation is
distributed and the entropy measures its indeterminacy.
Standard TMs can compute relations by computing its constituent functions.
However, the information provided by the intersections is lost if the functions
are considered as independent objects. The computing entropy measures the
information provided by such intersections. If the functions constituting a re-
lation are mostly independent, there are few intersections and the entropy is
high; however, if there is a large number intersections the entropy is decreased
and computations become more determined accordingly.
The inclusion of the entropy in a theory of computing gives rise to a new
computational trade-off that here is called The Entropy Trade-Off : If the en-
tropy of the machine is very low the computation is pretty determined, being the
TM the extreme fully determinate case whose entropy is zero; in the other ex-
treme, if the entropy is too high, the information is confused and computations
are not feasible. However, if the entropy is moderate there is a certain amount
of indeterminacy in the computing engine, that allows multiple behaviors and
computations are still feasible.
The entropy trade-off of computing engines corresponds to the potential
productivity of decisions in the environment.
The interaction of the agent with the environment introduces some inde-
terminacy to the computing process. The external input, such that the face
resulting of flipping a coin, is input into the agent’s control volume, as illus-
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Figure 2: Embedded Control Volumes
trated in Figure 2, and from its point of view the value of such variable is
genuinely random. Control volumes can be embedded in more extensive en-
vironments from the most specific ones to the universe as a whole. Whether
spontaneous events can occur within a control volume or the knowledge of such
events is a case of incomplete information is the deep question whose answer
opposes determinism and the indeterminate views of the world.
3. Table Computing and Associative Memory
The implementation of RIC in a table format is referred to as Table Com-
puting [6]. This format was used to define and implement an associative mem-
ory system, where standard tables are used as Associative Memory Registers
(AMRs) [7]. The system uses three main algorithms that perform operations
between the corresponding cells of memory registers directly, which are called
here Memory Register, Memory Recognize and Memory Retrieve. These
algorithms implement the λ, η and β operations respectively, and are so sim-
ple that here are called Minimal Algorithms. The objects stored in the AMRs
are distributed representations of individuals or classes of individuals. These
representations have an entropy level depending on the information stored in
the AMRs at a given time, and the memory system conforms to the entropy
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trade-off. The memory operations are computed in parallel, both between the
corresponding cells of AMRs and between the full set of AMRs included in the
memory system. This parallelism is a property of the memory at the com-
putational system level in Marr’s sense [8] and not only a contingency of the
implementation. The power of the distributed representation comes from the
coordinated simultaneous computing at all local memory cells and the AMRs.
3.1. A visual memory for hand written digits
The associative memory system was used for storing distributed represen-
tations of hand written digits [7]. In the experiment an associative register for
holding the representation of each one of the ten digits was defined. All in-
stance digits in the training corpus were placed on an input visual buffer, and
mapped into a set of features with their corresponding values –which is called
here the space of characteristics– through a standard deep-neural convolutional
network [9]. Intuitively, this corresponds to seeing each digit, mapping it into its
corresponding abstract modality independent representation through a bottom-
up perceptual operation, and registering it into its corresponding associative
register through the Memory Register algorithm.
The memory recognition operation was implemented by mapping the digit
to be recognized into its corresponding representation through the same deep-
neural network, and applying the Memory Recognize algorithm.
The results show that if the entropy is zero or very low the overall recog-
nition precision and recall are very low; that both precision and recall increase
according to the increase of the entropy, but that recall decreases when the en-
tropy is very high; that there is an interval of moderate entropy values in which
precision and recall are both very satisfactory; and that the entropy trade-off
holds. Such entropy interval determines the operational characteristics of the
associative memory system.
The experiment of memory retrieve consists on presenting arbitrary hand
written digits to the memory to be used as cues and map the recovered function
in the space of characteristics into a concrete representation in an output visual
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buffer through transposed convolution, as in standard architectures to generate
pictures out of abstract characteristics within the deep neural networks frame-
work [10]. The results show that the objects retrieved from memory are similar
to the cue only when the entropy is very low, and that the similarity decreases
quite sharply with small entropy increments. Memory retrieve is a constructive
operation such that the retrieved objects go from “photographic” images, to
similar images, to imaged objects, depending on whether the entropy is zero,
moderate or too high respectively.
The overall functionality of the memory system conforms to the intuition
that memory recognition is a flexible and robust capability but recovering or
retrieving objects from memory is a much more selective and restrictive opera-
tion.
In the present system information is stored and recognized locally through
the basic logical disjunction and material implication operations between cells of
tables or associative registers, in addition of the standard assignment operator
and a random generator. The memory system is associative, distributed and
declarative, and has a dual symbolic and sub-symbolic interpretation. The
experiment was implemented as a simulation in a standard processor with a
graphic GPU board, but the hardware construction of the device should not be
problematic with current integrated circuits technology.
4. Entropy and Cognitive Architecture
The computing engine that is causal and essential to cognition and rational-
ity needs to be related to the cognitive architecture of the agent. An architecture
including perception, motricity or action, thought, schematic thinking and reac-
tive behavior, which here is called Interaction-Oriented Cognitive Architecture
or IOCA,2 is illustrated in Figure 3. The architecture is stated in terms of
2IOCA is an abstract generalization of the architecture with the same name that was
implemented in the service robot Golem-III [11]. Publications and videos about this robot
are available at http://golem.iimas.unam.mx. Golem-III was built with standard digital
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Figure 3: Cognitive Architecture
functional modules, in the sense of other cognitive architectures such as SOAR
[12] and ACT-R [13]. The modules are stated at the computational theory in
Marr’s sense [8] and hence independently of particular representational formats
or processing strategies. The purpose of this presentation is to illustrate the
roles of the entropy, the potential productivity of decisions and the relational-
indeterminate computing in cognition.
Decision making is at the center of thought and rationality. Theories of ra-
tionality may be classified in three main kinds: i) those that support a general
mechanism that works according to first principles; ii) those that support that
thinking is schematic and carried out through a rich variety of specific mech-
anisms that allow an effective interaction with the environment; and iii) those
that support both modes. The first and second kinds are depicted by the mod-
ules Thought and Schemes in Figure 3. The present architecture is an instance
of the third kind.
Theories sustaining that thought uses a general mechanism and conforms to
computers and its only source of entropy is the external environment, which is very predictable
in the traditional competition settings and benchmarks for this kind of devices, and the overall
behavior, including the decisions made by the robot, is quite predetermined.
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first principles are exemplified by the logical and propositional view of knowl-
edge; by the bayesian reasoning approach to induce causes of events or phenom-
ena on the basis of their observable effects; and by theories holding that decision
making is a matter of maximizing the expected value of decisions and actions,
as in game theory.
Thought was addressed since the origins of Artificial Intelligence and the
proposal of Bounded Rationality [14, 15]. The original program used the min-
imax decision making strategy although computed with limited computational
resources and aided by heuristics. In this respect it departed explicitly from the
omniscient rationality and from the notion of economical or administrative man
advocated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in Game Theory and Economic
Behavior [16]. This research program gave rise to the Physical Symbol Systems
Hypothesis holding that a system of grounded symbols provides the necessary
and sufficient conditions to produce general intelligence [17, 18], and was fur-
ther developed with Newell’s claim that there is a system level directly above
the symbol level, that he called the knowledge level, in which the only rule of
behavior is what he called The Principle of Rationality [19].
This program was later developed into the SOAR [12] and ACT-R [13] cog-
nitive architectures, the former focused on modeling AI tasks and applications
and the latter on developing a theory of mind and its relation to the brain. In
this paradigm, decision making was conceived as a pure thought process where
rationality was enacted through symbolic manipulation; interpretations were
already available in the symbolic format; and the actions performed with the
purpose of satisfying the agent’s decisions achieved their intended effect neces-
sarily. In practice, interpretations and actions were performed by human-users
and computational thought was detached from the world, as in computer chess
and similar programs.
This limitation of the original program of AI has been addressed from dif-
ferent perspectives such as neural networks [20] and probabilistic causal models
(e.g., [21, 22]), which reject symbolic representations, and embedded architec-
tures [23], embodied cognition [24] and enactivism [25], that reject representa-
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tions and symbolic computing altogether. However, regardless whether or not
thought and memory are representational or implemented through symbolic or
sub-symbolic computing, these faculties have to be connected with the world
through perception and action in a principled way.
Schematic thinking, on its part, consists on mapping interpretation into ac-
tions through a specialized module. Schemes may be innate, although they
may be used contingently by analogy to learned concepts, or may be devel-
oped through experience and manifested as habitual behavior. The Schemes
module is exemplified by the so-called procedural representations in Artificial
Intelligence, such as Minsky’s Frames [26], that opposed production systems and
logical approaches, which may be considered general reasoning mechanisms.
Theories of thought and decision making should also be seen in relation of
two perspectives: the mechanisms that the agent uses to make decisions and
the constraints of the environment that allow such decisions be enacted in the
world. The potential productivity of decisions measures the overall impact that
decisions can have in an environment, but particular decisions should take into
account such constraints and this knowledge should be available in memory.
Since the early work of Simon [27] theories of bounded rationality distin-
guish behavioral constraints that relate to the decision maker, from external
constraints that refer to the ecological structure of the environment. However,
the characterization of what is “behavioral” and what is “external” is by no
means easy to make. In practice, reasoning has traditionally lean to model
behavioral constraints and the need for an ecologically motivated research pro-
gram has been called for (e.g., [28, 29]). This concern has been addressed more
recently within the so-called Ecological Rationality (e.g., [30]) which investigates
the coupling between the heuristics and the features of the environment for act-
ing effectively in the world through a continuous interacting cycle. Heuristics
in this latter paradigm are commonly described as algorithmic encapsulated
processes.
The dual theory, in turn, considers that thinking and problem solving do
require a general deliberative mechanism, but thought is an expensive resource
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and this module may be bypassed by schemes that map the output of perception
into the input of the motricity module. Conversely, schemes may be quite
rigid and lead to irrational behavior, but this can be avoided if the agent is
a competent subject and has the interest and the energy to address the task
through deliberative thinking (e.g., [31]).
The observations can also be connected directly with basic actions rendering
reactive behavior, as illustrated by the dotted arrow in Figure 3. In this archi-
tecture the agent is always engaged in a cycle of perception, schematic behavior
and action, that uses thought on demand and embeds reactive behavior; hence
the name IOCA. The architecture is only a schematic idealization, as in natural
cognitive architectures the functional modules may overlap and the boundaries
between them may be loosely demarcated.
4.1. Interpretation and Action
The inputs of the perception module are the observations that the agent
sense in the environment and the relevant knowledge stored in memory, and its
outputs are the corresponding interpretations. These are in turn the inputs to
the thought module, in which reasoning is performed. Thought interacts with
memory, where knowledge is registered and recalled, and its outputs are the
intentions of the agent, which are construed here as specifications for actions that
can be rendered through linguistic or motor behavior. The motricity module has
as its inputs the intentions produced by thought but also interacts with memory,
and its outputs are the actions that the agent performs in the environment.
The perception module is stated in the Bayesian perspective. The agent is
endowed with the capacity to make observations O, by organizing the infor-
mation provided by the senses into a basic entity, property or scene, such as a
physician feeling the heat of the patient’s body or the chess player identifying
the pieces on the board. The observations can be performed by anyone who
has not a particular impairment preventing him or her to do so, and can be
considered innate. Observations are the manifestation of events in the world,
and perception produces the hypotheses of what are such events on the basis of
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the observations and the relevant knowledge. The term P (E/O) stands for the
most likely event that happened in the world given the observation. As there
may be many potential events, the best hypothesis is the event that maximizes
this value for the given observation. This term is the output of perception or
The Interpretation.
This is computed by Bayes’s theorem which is stated as follows: P (E/O) =
ArgMaxEP (O/E) × P (E)/P (O). The term P (O/E) –the likelihood– repre-
sents, for instance, the ability of a physician to be able to tell how likely is that
the patient has fiver if he or she has typhoid –the observation and the event re-
spectively. This term represents the expertise of the physician that is acquired
through the years of practice, and is readily available when an observation is
made. Here this term is referred to as The Perceptual Ability.
The term P (E), on its part, usually referred to as the prior, stands for the
knowledge of the agent of how likely is that such an event occurs in the world.
For instance, the physician may know that 9 out of 10 children in town have
typhoid.
Finally, the term P (O) is the probability of the observation. This probability
is in turn P (O/E)× P (E) + P (O/E)× P (E) where the first and second terms
of the sum correspond to the true and false positives –the times the observation
was produced by the event and the times the observation was produced by
other events. However, the term P (O) is dropped in the standard formulation
of the noisy channel because the computation aims to select the most likely
event in relation to the same observation, and the full expression is simplified to
P (E/O) = ArgMaxEP (O/E)×P (E). The resulting value is a weighing factor
rather than a probability, but it is enough to compute the best interpretation.
The bayesian expression states simply that the best interpretation hypothesis is
that the event that most likely happened is the one that maximizes the product
of the likelihood and the prior.
The hypothesis that people make interpretations using Bayes’ theorem has
been tested and the early empirical evidence suggested that this is not the
case [32, 33] and that people normally ignore the priors when individuating
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or specific information is available, the so-called base-rate neglect or fallacy
(e.g., [32]). However, base rates interact with specific information, and whether
they are considered depends on their relevance for the task at hand [34]. More
recently it has been argued that the experiments that gave rise to such result
were based on the implicit assumption that people, for instance, physicians, use
Bayes’ theorem in the standard probability format. In those experimentes the
posterior probability P (E/O) had to be computed given the prior, the likelihood
and the rate of false positives (often called the base rate, the hit rate and the false
alarm rate) and the experiments assumed that the Bayes’ theorem is known and
can be used operationally, but as normal people, such as most physicians, are
never taught probability theory and are unfamiliar with the probability format,
this knowledge must be innate and subconscious. No surprisingly people in
general do very poorly.
However, presenting the information as natural frequencies do support natu-
ral bayesian reasoning [35, 29] and that base-rate neglect is unfounded [28]. For
instance, if instead of the actual probabilities a physician knows the number of
people in his or her demarcation, those who have presented an illness and had
the symptoms, and those who had the symptoms but did not have the illness,
he or she can compute the actual posterior probability, although using a sim-
pler but correct form of Bayes’ formula. Gigerenzer [35] calls the latter form of
acquiring the information the natural frequency format and argues very clearly
that the same mathematical object –in this case Bayes’ theorem– can have dif-
ferent representations and be computed by different algorithms, and that the
information should be presented in the appropriate format.
From an ecological and evolutive perspective the information format must be
available directly in the environment (e.g., [29]) but the interpretation machine
must map such format into one akin for memory and processing too. Clearly, if
the information is presented in the probabilities format but the processor and
memory use a natural frequencies format or vice versa, there would have to be
a costly and unnatural translation.
An instance of the natural frequencies format all the way through is illus-
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trated by the associative memory presented in Section 3. There, the digits
instances in the external medium are feed in serially into their corresponding
associative registers through a transfer function, implemented by the neural
network, that places the information in the standard configuration of the table
computing machine. This format consists on a large number of abstract amodal
features that are analogous to their modality specific input and output represen-
tations –the digits on a piece of paper or a computer screen that are input and
output through modality specific buffers– and all instances of the same digit are
represented in a table but abstracted through the logical disjunction operation.
Hence, the format used by the memory corresponds to a natural frequencies
format.
The mapping from the input modal buffer into its corresponding amodal
representation corresponds to computing a likelihood; recognizing or retrieving
the content of the memory registers corresponds to computing a prior; and the
memory recognition and recall operations correspond to selecting the object that
matches the cue from its right memory register among all the other registers, and
“maximizes” “the product” of “the likelihood” and “the prior”. For instance,
in the experiment in Section 3.1 the likelihood is the descriptor representing the
cue provided by the input neural network –which plays the role of the bottom-
up or low-level perception; the “events” are the digits presented to the agent
for recognition or recall, whose representations are stored in their corresponding
associative memory registers. These contain the abstractions of all instances of
the corresponding digits previously seen and registered; and the maximization
operation corresponds to recognizing and retrieving one specific digit among the
ten possible ones, on the basis of the cue.
This suggests that Bayesian interpretation does not mean necessarily that
people actually compute the posterior probability and that there may be other
modes of computing that implement the process in a more effective way. The
purpose of the computation is to interpret the observation presented for recog-
nition: a clinical physician is concerned with choosing the most likely disease
given the symptoms and his or her knowledge and experience, in order to decide
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the best treatment, but he or she does not need to know mathematics and make
the actual computations, as it is the case commonly.
From the neurosciences perspective, perception, action, learning and mem-
ory accord to Bayesian principles, the so-called Bayesian brain hypothesis [36].
The implicit Bayesian maximization involved in the production of the inter-
pretation may require a cycle of memory recall operations such the current
interpretation is compared with the likelihood of the next observation, and the
final interpretation is stable enough to be reliable.
There may be a wide variety formats, representational systems and process-
ing strategies and the basic intuition underlying Bayes’ theorem can be gen-
eralized into the proposition that the best interpretation strategy is to select
the best hypothesis that results from pondering the information provided by
the perceptual abilities with the relevant knowledge available in memory. This
intuition is very strong and is referred to here as The Principle of Interpretation.
The Bayesian analysis can be applied for the action part or the motricity
module that generates the action, as illustrated in Figure 3. In this case the
inputs are the intentions I produced by thought which need to be enacted
through the actions that the agent can perform, and the output is the best
action that achieves the intention, which is designated by the term P (A/I). The
bayesian expression for the action case is P (A/I) = ArgMaxAP (I/A)× P (A).
As in the interpretation case, the goal is to chose the best action in relation to
the same intention, and the probability of the intention can be dropped.
The likelihood P (I/A) represents the extent to which performing a particular
action renders the given intention, or the extent to which the intention can be
achieved given that the action is performed. For instance, that a melody will be
produced given that a sequence of keys is pressed on the piano. The primitive
or innate actions A can be performed by anyone, such as pressing the keys, but
to produce music by playing the piano requires years of rehearsing. The ability
is acquired through practice and experience, as in perception, and this latter
likelihood is called here The Motor Ability.
The term P (A), on its part, represents the feasibility that the action can be
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enacted in the environment. This involves behavioral constraints of the agent,
such as his or her capacity to perform such action, or the cost that needs to
be afforded for achieving it, but also external aspects that depend on both
the physical environment and the dispositions and intentions of other agents
or the society. The external aspects correspond to the potential productivity
of decisions, but for particular actions. If this knowledge is not considered the
actions may not achieve the intended effect due to factors that are not under
the control of the agent.
Finally, the bayesian law selects the action that maximizes the product of
the motor abilities with the cost or feasibility of the action. As in the interpre-
tation case, the motor ability and the knowledge about actions can be expressed
through a variety of formats and computing strategies.
On the basis of these consideration the bayesian law can be generalized into
the proposition that the best strategy for acting in the world is to select the
best action that satisfy the intention by pondering the information provided by
the motor abilities with the knowledge about the actions available in memory.
This latter proposition is referred to here as The Principle of Action.
Perception and action are commonly modeled through standard algorithms
and the entropy of the machine is not considered or is zero. However, natural
memory is entropic most likely, memory recall is an indeterminate operation, the
links from memory into perception and action introduce a level of indeterminacy,
and perception and action conform to the entropy trade-off.
4.2. Schematic Thinking
Schematic behavior relates perception and action through specific highly
specialized modules. A paradigmatic form of schematic behavior may be daily-
life intentional behavior –walking, eating, bathing, talking, etc. These kinds
of actions bypass thought and relate perceptual and motor abilities directly, as
long as the expectations of the agent are met in the world. However, when
a spontaneous event occurs in a relevant respect, there is an interruption and
rational agents engage in a deliberative thought process. The schematic behavior
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may be put on hold to attend the event, or may be continued and performed
simultaneously with thought, but the attention is focused on this latter process.
In Cognitive Psychology schematic thinking is exemplified by the use of
heuristics that explain biased but systematic behaviors [32], that were presented
in opposition to Bayesian Inference [35, 29]. In such view the heuristics handle
diverse sorts of common interpretation rightly and very effectively, although on
occasions they can lead to irrational behavior.
A more recent illustration provided within the ecological rationality is the
so-called gaze-heuristics which is used to track objects following a trajectory,
such as baseball players catching a ball. It consists on fixating the gaze on the
ball, start running and adjust the speed so that the angle of gaze in relation
to the ground remains constant [30]. In this behavior there is a continuous
interpretation and action process, and the essence of the heuristics is to compute
the speed as a function of the angle. In a physical model the full trajectory
would have to be computed, but, according to ecological rationality, this is too
complex and people are unable to do it. Nevertheless, in such view it is held
at the same time that the angle and the speed are much simpler computations
that are actually performed by people in real time. However, computing these
parameter requieres significant computational resources, metric systems and
measuring devices, which might not be available to people and other higher
evolved animals that can achieve these tricks; and natural computing should
proceed by other means.
In the present proposal computing the scheme can be construed as follows:
the perceptual ability produces the angle –represented in a space of abstract
and amodal characteristics– out of the image in the input visual buffer; this
interpretation is the argument of a scheme mapping the angle into a speed –in
the same abstract and amodal space– but implemented through table computing
or some form of analogical or diagrammatic reasoning, which does not use a
standard algorithm involving costly computations. The speed is in turn the
input to the perceptual ability and the motricity module renders the action
through the motor actuators.
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This basic model does not resort to memory and although computing the
scheme directly may be very effective, the agent may not be able to adapt to
even slight changes in the environment. A more robust model would include
a perceptual and a motor memory for enriching the input interpretation and
considering the potential contingencies of the action, and the overall behavior
would be informed by the knowledge of the agent, according to the full use of
the principles of interpretation and action.
Schemes compute functions or relations whose arguments and values stand
for the interpretations and intentions respectively. Schemes are normally im-
plemented through standard algorithms and compute by TMs, but they can
be implemented by other means, such as neural networks, analogical and dia-
grammatic machines, or the relational-indeterminate implemented through ta-
ble computing, among other specialized modes of computing. In case entropic
processes are included, behavior would be more flexible and should obey the
entropy-trade off.
In any case, motor actions produced through schematic behavior are highly
conditioned by perception and the scheme proper. To say that the baseball
player makes the decision to increase or decrease its speed and the positions of
his or her body organs is a manner of speaking. Explicit decision making and
deliberative thought allows people to anticipate the world in the short, middle
and long term, and the relation between interpretation and intentional action is
mediated by knowledge and values. For this, deliberative and schematic thinking
should be distinguished.
4.3. Thought and Decision Making
The thought module is zoomed in Figure 4. Its inputs and outputs are
the interpretations produced by perception and the intentions that need to be
enacted by the motricity module respectively. The thought process consists on
a pipeline of a diagnosis, a decision making and a planning inferences.
The input to the diagnosis module is the interpretation of the event that
caused the interruption of the schematic cycle and its output is a hypothesis
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Figure 4: The Inference Pipe-line of Thought
of its cause, which is the main input to the decision making module. This
latter module has other inputs such as the agent’s interest, preferences, values,
affections, etc., which may have a subjective component, and its output is the
decision proper: what to do about the interpretation hypothesis. The decision
is in turn the goal of the planning module whose output is the specification of
the actions that need to be carried out in order to enact the decision and the
output of the thought process as a whole is the intention. The intentions are
enacted as actions and the agent must verify that the effects of the actions are
as expected and may remain engaged in an inference cycle until the intended
effects are achieved. This cycle is also accompanied by learning, so the agent is
better prepared to deal with similar contingencies in the future.
For instance, someone enters into his or her house and sees a puddle in the
living room coming out of the kitchen. This is already an interpretation that can
be express linguistically. The problem for the house owner is what to do about
it but first he or she needs to find out what is the cause of the observation, and
a diagnosis inference is performed. This process can be thought of in bayesian
terms but also as a case of abductive symbolic reasoning, which underlies the
same basic intuition. The diagnosis involves the synthesis of a set of hypotheses,
such as that a pipe was broken or that his or her child forgot to turn off the
faucet. The output of the diagnostics module is a ranked set of hypothetical
causes, which is the main input to the decision making module, in addition to
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the subjective inputs as discussed above and illustrated in Figure 4, and its
output is the decision proper. If the diagnosis was that the sink tap was turned
on, the decision is to turn it off and dry the puddle; but if the diagnosis was
that a pipe was broken, the decision is to fix it. Another potential decision is
doing nothing, but the subjective inputs, such as the interests and values, place
the decision in a deeper perspective, and modulate the decisions that particular
agents make.
The decision becomes the goal of a plan, that has to be induced and executed.
For instance, if the decision is to turn off the tap and dry the puddle, the plan
may be go into the kitchen, stand in front of the sink, turn off the tap, get a
mop and dry the floor; but if it is to fix the pipe, the plan may be turn off the
house main water valve and phone the plumber. The output of the planning
module is the specification of the actions that need to be performed with the
purpose that the decision is enacted. This specification is the intention, which
is the input to the motricity module. Some of the actions may be performed
linguistically and other by physical motor behavior, but in the end these are all
motor actions. The agent needs to monitor whether the effects of the actions
are as expected through the main interaction cycle with the world, and remain
engaged recurrently until the plan is achieved and the problem that gave rise to
the thought process is fixed.3
An additional input to the decision making module is the knowledge whether
the decision can be enacted in the world. Some of this information depends on
the types of actions that the agent can perform through its motricity module,
but there is an additional dimension that depends on the knowledge of the
causal structure and uncertainty of the world. Each particular decision made
by a particular agent may or may not be enacted due to environmental or
ecological aspects, and a good decision maker should take into account such
3This cycle of inference has been implemented in the robot Golem-III. Videos showing the
robot performing simple tasks but involving the full inferential pipe are available at http:
//golem.iimas.unam.mx/inference-in-service-robots
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external factors.
More generally, decision making is placed within the two different sources
of indeterminacy: the computing entropy of the engine that carries on with the
thought process, and the entropy of the environment, and there is a Decision
Making Trade-off : the best decision is the one that results from pondering the
value of the potential decisions with the uncertainty that they can be enacted
in the environment. The largest the value of the decision for the agent and
the lesser the uncertainty that such a decision can be enacted, the better the
decision. This is also an application of the Bayesian principle, where the value
of the decisions to achieve and intended effect can be seen as a likelihood and
the knowledge of whether the effect can be enacted in the world as a prior.
As in perception, action and schematic behavior, it is possible to hypothesize
that deliberative thought is performed through direct mechanisms and has an
implicit entropy, and conforms to the entropy trade-off.
4.4. Memory versus Abilities
Knowledge stored in memory opposes perceptual and motor abilities in sev-
eral dimensions. While the former is available in memory, can be expressed
declaratively, and is acquired and learned through language, the latter are deeply
embedded in the perceptual and motor structures and are acquired through ex-
tensive training. While knowledge is registered, recognized and retrieved from
memory and used in language, abilities are used but the information that is
causal to their deployment cannot be recalled or remembered. While knowledge
is transparent to consciousness, at least when is stored or is retrieved from mem-
ory or used in reasoning, and can be the object of reflection and introspection,
the experience of deploying an ability is felt but opaque to consciousness; and
while knowledge is causal and essential to intentional behavior, the reports or
explanations of what is the “knowledge” involved in abilities are a posteriori
reconstructions of the processes that are causal to the experience itself. Abili-
ties are embedded deeply into the perceptual and motor engines, but knowledge
is better thought of as the object that is held in memory. Schemes are sim-
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ilar in most of these respects to abilities, although may have a larger innate
component, and oppose to knowledge in the same dimensions.
In AI symbolic systems knowledge is held in knowledge bases, that may hold
incomplete information, may involve interpretation heuristics and may perform
conceptual reasoning directly, and have a mostly symbolic character. Knowl-
edge can be stored and retrieved, used in reasoning and inform perception and
action, and the functional module that holds such a kind of information may be
considered a memory proper.
Symbolic knowledge-bases oppose sub-symbolic machines, such as neural
networks. These latter machines cannot express symbolic structures; hence,
cannot hold information declaratively, and individual or episodic memories can-
not be recalled. For these reasons sub-symbolic systems are better thought of
as transfer functions for classification or prediction, for instance, but should not
be considered proper memories (e.g., [37]).
The associative memory in the present architecture has both a symbolic
and a sub-symbolic aspects. The interpretation of the register’s content as a
whole has a symbolic character but its structure is sub-symbolic. Memories
are entropic computing machines and the entropy trade-off establishes their op-
erational range. The associative memory registers in the experiment reported
in Section 3.1 hold only basic units of content, such as the digits. This is a
proof on concept experiment, and it is an open question whether other kinds
of individual objects can be modeled, or whether larger structures for holding
composite contents can be created, but the experiment suggests that the causal
and essential engine that gives rise to memory may have such a kind of dis-
tributed structure, that hold the information in natural but abstract formats,
and computing is performed through minimal algorithms.
The cognitive architecture also suggests the possibility that logical reasoning
can be a memory operation in which the premises and conclusions of arguments
are represented in the space of characteristics, such that the representation of
the premises is included in the representation of the conclusion. This would
allow for a representational view of knowledge, but one in which the actual
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symbols appear only in the input and output modality specific buffers, and
the “symbolic manipulation” consists on memory operations in the abstract
characteristics space.
4.5. Natural Computing and Minimal Algorithms
Natural frequencies do present the information in a manner more akin to the
natural mode of computing than other formats, such as standard mathematical
notation. However, according to standard thinking in Cognitive Science, com-
puting is nevertheless performed using standard algorithms in a TM or some
equivalent machine. The intuition is that the human brain is such a powerful
machine that can easily evaluate the arithmetic operations involved in the com-
putation (e.g., [29, 30]); hence people do use algorithms in the manner that they
are computed by digital computers of the standard sort.
However, the format of the Turing Machine is linguistic and propositional
–representations are strings of symbols on the tape– and if the brain were a
TM the natural frequency format would have to be translated into the symbolic
or propositional one, and computing would be equally hard. Conversely, the
probabilistic format is a propositional representation and if this were the actual
format employed by the machine, probabilistic reasoning in this format would
be easy. More generally, for computing to be effective the format in which
the information is presented should be alike to the actual format in which the
computations are performed.
This proposition is stated in more general terms in the theory of Turing
Machines and computability, and is a fundamental concept in computer science
and the construction of computing machinery: TMs’ representations are subject
to a set of interpretations conventions and to a standard configuration. The
former are needed to interpret the workings of the machine, starting with the
most basic convention that a TM computes a function, and that the input and
output strings represent the argument and value respectively.
The standard configuration in turn specifies the format of the representations
in relation to the finite control including the scanning device and the computing
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medium; for instance, if the medium is a tape, a grid or a set RAM registers.
The configuration specifies as well how the input and output devices, such as
the keyboard and the monitor, must place and take the information from the
central processing unit, and also allows that the output string of one computa-
tion can be the input to the next. The interpretation conventions and standard
configuration of table computing described in Section 3 are specified according
to these criteria.
Sustaining that the mind uses algorithms computed by a TM is an a posteri-
ori rationalization but not a causal explanation of mental behavior. Mathemati-
cal concepts, notations and metric systems are historical and cultural constructs,
that appeared much latter than the machinery used by natural computing, and
there is no reason to suppose that the brain and the mind use such constructs, in
the same sense that there is no reason to suppose that rationalizations provided
by people of the knowledge involved in deploying an ability, such as riding a
bicycle, are causal explanations.
Traditional approaches to rationality focus on the general mechanisms and
the particular strategies that support rational behavior, and underly the as-
sumption that computing is performed through a general computing device such
as the Turing Machine. The present theory suggests to reverse such view and
focus on the computing engine that is causal to rational behavior.
Postulating mental algorithms is a very productive metaphor that has con-
tribute to make great progress in Cognitive Science, but interpreting it literally
cannot be sustained unless the specification of the mode or modes of natural
computing is provided.
The actual natural computing engine is likely to use a highly distributed for-
mat where computing is performed by very simple processing units that compute
very simple algorithms. The complexity comes from the coordinated computa-
tion of such units. The interpretation of such distributed representations as
whole units of content is exemplified by minimal algorithms. This view is quite
similar to the initial formulation of neural networks [20] but its implementation
in table computing, for instance, can be done with massive arrays that perform
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computations in parallel in a few computing steps, and does not need to be
reduced to TMs and computed through costly algorithms, as has been the case
with artificial neural networks to the present day.
5. Levels of Cognition
The cognitive architecture in Figure 3 includes the main modules of cogni-
tion but some of its components or even full modules can be removed, rendering
simpler forms of cognition. Here three main levels are distinguished: 1) the full
architecture supporting perception and action, schematic behavior, deliberative
thought and memory; 2) the architecture resulting from removing the delib-
erative thought and the memory modules but preserving the schemes; and 3)
the one supporting only basic observations and actions, and rendering reactive
behavior.
In a level-2 architecture “the intentions” are reduced to the output of the
schemes which drives the action directly. This architecture preserves the per-
ceptual and action abilities, and behavior may be refined through training and
rehearsing, but lacks the input from deliberative thought and memory, and
there is no genuine decision making. Agents that have such an architecture
do not have knowledge proper, learning is reduced to training, and behavior is
schematic and data-driven.
This kind of agents may be biased due to both the schemes and the training
data, and such prejudices could not be modulated because the lack of knowledge.
This is a strong limitation in relation to the fully rational architecture where
the perceptual and the action abilities are also trained on the basis on empirical
data, but the knowledge acquired and learned through language allows for the
appearance of values, and the development of an affective logic, and biases and
prejudices can be modulated, reduced and even eliminated.
The level-2 architecture is exemplified by current deep-learning and rein-
forcement learning models and their applications [9]; for instance, self-driven
vehicles such as cars and drones, and even chess, shogi and go playing programs
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[38].
The level-3 architecture only supports basic or “innate” observations and
motor actions which are connected directly, and agents endowed of these ca-
pabilities have very limited or none training capabilities, and deploy mostly
reactive behavior. Agents with this kind of architecture do not make interpre-
tations and hence do not communicate.
Agents with architecture level-1 may bypass thought and use perceptual
and action abilities directly, which can also be bypassed by reactive behaviors;
hence, the level-1 architecture embeds a level-2 and a level-3, and agents with a
level-2 architecture embed a level-3 too. The hierarchical embedding, along the
lines proposed by Brooks [23], may be essential for effective interaction with the
world.
6. Principle of Rationality
A computing agent is rational to the degree in which its actions allow it to
survive and improve its living conditions, for itself and for other agents in its
environment, in the short, middle and long term. A precondition of rationality
is that the agent’s intentions reflect its own needs and desires; that the decision
making engine conforms to the decision making trade-off; that schematic be-
havior is effective but biases are prevented; that the agent behaves according to
the principles of interpretation and action; and that the potential productivity
of decisions allows or provides the space for decisions to be enacted. This is
referred to here as The Principle of Rationality.
Perception produces an interpretation hypothesis about the state of the
world; a decision is a hypothesis about the best course of action to achieve
a state of the world that the agent believes is needed or desired; the intention
underlies such a hypothesis; an action is based on the hypothesis that its conse-
quences will satisfy such intention; and the whole cycle of perception, thought
and/or schematic behavior and action is hypothetical. As in evolution –where
genetic accidents produce traits that enhance, inhibit or create new capabilities,
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but only those that provide an advantage are preserved, with the consequent
impact on the individual agent and the species– there is no objective mea-
sure or judgement of how rational is behavior but its consequences –benefits or
shortcomings– for the agent and its social and physical environment.
Irrational behavior occurs when decisions and actions harm or diminish the
quality of life of the agent and/or the environment. These behaviors may be
due to impairments in perception and action, or to limitations in thought and
decision making, or to the use of heuristics that result on unfounded actions.
Rational behavior should conform to the entropy trade-off and the environ-
ment should sustain a moderate level of entropy where the potential productivity
of decisions is satisfactory or optimal. If the entropy of the computing engine
is too low, in relation to the normal level, the agent will act obsessively or ac-
cording to stereotypes, and will not have the flexibility required to attend the
changing demands of the environment; but if the entropy is too high in relation
to the normal level, the behavior would not be focused to act productively, as
when the attention is impaired. In a sense, a healthy mind and genuine decision
making would reflect a moderate or optimal level of entropy.
The present principle of rationality opposes Newell’s corresponding principle.
In his view, thought is a “pure process” performed by symbolic manipulation
while in present formulation thought and memory are related to perception and
action in a congruent manner, and the agent is placed or grounded in the world.
7. Brain Entropy
The brain is an entropic machine that sustains a large number of states.
A brain state consists of a reliable pattern of brain activity that involves the
activation and/or connectivity of multiple large-scale brain networks, and some
states, such as rest, alert and mediation, have been studied [39]. Brain states
may have a large number of substates whose ongoing fluctuations influence
strongly higher cognitive functions [40] and the brain entropy may be related
to the number of states that are accessible for brain functioning [41].
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The entropy of a brain state can be measured through functional fMRI [42].
The region under study is divided into voxels, each having a unique value of
the blood-oxygen-level-dependent signal (BOLD) at the scanning time, which is
correlated with the level of activity of the voxel, and maps of the activity of the
brain when people are performing a mental task can be created. The technique
consists on registering a sequence or window of BOLD values over time and
computing the indeterminacy of a voxel, which can be characterized through
the so-called Sample Entropy or SampEn. This methodology has been applied
to measure the changes of the brain entropy while a periodic sensorimotor task
was performed, with the following results [42]:
• Brain entropy provides a physiologically and functionally meaningful brain
activity measure.
• There was an entropy decrease in the visual and sensorimotor brain regions
associated to the task in relation to the rest state.
• The entropy of the neocortex regions is lower than the entropy of the rest
of the brain –cerebellum, brain stem, limbic area, etc.
• Entropy brain clusters with particular levels of entropy correspond to
anatomical or functional areas of the brain.
The levels of entropy of the neocortex suggest that the brain conforms to the
entropy trade-off. There is a range of entropy values in which interpretation,
thought and intentional actions can be effective, as sustained by the free-energy
principle and the Bayesian brain hypothesis [36]. Other brain structures sus-
taining higher entropies constitute standard biological machinery that supports
but do not make interpretations proper. The cited experiment suggests that
the resting state is flexible enough to address the changing demands of the envi-
ronment, and hence its relatively higher level of entropy, but the entropy lowers
when intentional task are performed to achieve the focus and specificity required
for performing higher cognitive functions.
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The relation between intelligence and brain entropy has been investigated,
and a correlation between the entropy at the resting-state and intelligence –
measured with verbal and performance IQ tests– has been found [41]: the higher
the entropy the higher the IQ. This result is somehow paradoxical because higher
IQ is associated to higher leves of indeterminacy, and the experiment is at odds
with the entropy decrease associated to intelligence. However, the result can be
placed in the perspective of the entropy trade-off which suggests that lower IQ
is associated to rigid or predetermined behavior, a higher IQ requieres some de-
gree of indeterminacy, but if the entropy is increased considerably, performance
would be decreased accordingly.
Although there is not a well-established and widely accepted notion of brain
state, and the current measure of brain entropy may be a gross approxima-
tion, the present considerations, in conjunction with the notions of relational-
indeterminate computing and the computing entropy, suggest that the neocortex
functional regions of the brain are computing entropic engines, and hence they
are not Turing Machines, and the brain as a whole is not a Turing Machine.
These considerations also suggest that older cortical and subcortical regions
should have a very high entropy and may not be considered computing engines.
8. Technical Challenges and Predictions
The cognitive architecture can be simulated with a TM and in such case
the computations are deterministic. If perception, action, schematic behavior,
thought and memory, are simulated with standard digital computers, the in-
duction of interpretations, the synthesis of actions, and the decision making
process are predetermined. There may be some indeterminacy due to the en-
tropy of the environment, but if the process is carried on by a TM its entropy
is zero. However, if the simulation is made with other modes of computing
that are intrinsically entropic, such as the relational-indeterminate, or perhaps
analogical or quantum computing, or even holography, there may be a level of
indeterminacy of the computing agent in addition to the indeterminacy of the
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environment, and decision making may be free in such degree.
The present theory poses the challenge of defining and implementing com-
puting processes and associative memories with minimal algorithms that are
causal to such kind of behavior.
The present theory suggests as well a number of hypotheses that may be
tested empirically, for instance:
• Evolutionary psychology and sociology:
– The potential productivity of decisions: it may be possible to define
natural control volumes of human and non-human animal environ-
ments, measure their entropies, and count the productive behavioral
changes due to communication. If the prediction is sound a τ -profile
should be identified. The value of τ could predict social phenomena,
such as the size or degree of organization of a social group.
– The entropy should be related to the phylogeny of the brain: the
oldest structures should have a large level of entropy and the entropy
level should decrease according to the more varied and flexible behav-
ior of younger structures; the neocortex, associated to the executive
functions, should have the lower levels of entropy in the resting state,
as suggested by the results cited above.
– The brain entropy of animals in the resting state with more developed
neural structures should be lower than the entropy of less developed
animals in analogous brain states.
• Neurosciences:
– The entropy of the brain functional modules: the entropy of brain
structures associated to perceptual and motor abilities and schematic
behavior should decrease to a lower enough level from the resting
state to achieve the determinism associated to concrete interpreta-
tions and actions. The brain entropy associated to thought and mem-
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ory should also decrease from the resting state, but it must remain
high enough to allow for creative thinking and memory.
– Long term memory should have a higher entropy level than working
memory in the resting state. Natural forgetting occurs if the entropy
exceeds the operational range of long term memory as the stored
concepts are confused. If the entropy of working memory gets too
low, on the other hand, thinking becomes schematic and behavior is
more predictable.
– Mental disorders: disorders of attentional networks and particular
conditions [43, 44] should be associated to abnormal levels of entropy
in relation to the resting state; for instance, obsessive-compulsive
disorder should be associated to lower than normal levels; Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHS) to higher than normal levels;
and depressive and maniac states should be associated to lower and
higher than normal levels respectively.
• Cognitive Psychology:
– Concrete versus abstract thought: The brain entropy decrease in
relation to the resting state should be greater in concrete problem
solving than in abstract thinking.
– Propositional versus Analogical and Diagrammatic Reasoning: The
brain entropy decrease of symbolic or propositional reasoning, which
is more algorithmic, should be larger than the entropy decrease of
diagrammatic or analogical reasoning, that may be more natural.
– Higher intelligence is associated to a better executive control, hence
the entropy level of the central executive should be correlated with
intelligence within its operational entropy range. The correlation
between higher IQ and higher entropy [41] supports this prediction.
However, if the entropy of the central executive exceeds its optimal
value the IQ should decrease according to the entropy trade-off.
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A more intriguing and fundamental conjecture is that the mind evolved from
communicating. Entities that do not communicate are merely reactive and have
zero entropy, hence do not make interpretations and may not sense or experi-
ence the world. Schematic behavior is the paradigmatic form of experiencing
the world somehow unconsciously, that is common in human and non-human
animals with a developed enough nervous system; and deliberative thought is
a form of experience that involves decision making and anticipating the world,
where communication is a more productive behavior, as characterized by the
potential productivity of decisions. The decrease of the entropy but taking into
account the entropy trade-off may be correlated with the level of experience and
consciousness in humans and a great variety of animal species.
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